

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2005/03/24 : CIA-RDP83M00171R000200010003-2

8 DEC 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:
Director of Performance Evaluation and Improvement

FROM:

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Contribution of Intelligence to Net
Assessment of Performance of Soviet Ballistic
Missiles

1. ☐ In response to your memorandum dated 1 December 1977, "Near-term Work Program," the following program plan has been prepared.

2. ☐ This study is intended to:

--provide the DCI with an overview of intelligence which provides key elements for assessing strategic offensive missile performance; and

--as much as possible, provide indications of those programs and processes which should be promoted or slowed to more efficiently evaluate strategic offensive missile performance which impact US programs.

To accomplish these objectives, a series of interviews will be conducted within production, processing, and collection elements. Contractors will be contacted after initial discussions with production agencies. Organizations in the Washington area include:

--National Foreign Assessment Center - Office of Weapons Intelligence;

--Defense Intelligence Agency - Ballistic Missile Systems and Aerodynamic Missile Systems Sections;

--Air Force Intelligence - Aircraft, Missile, and Space Section;

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/03/24 : CIA-RDP83M00171R000200010003-2

~~TOP SECRET~~


~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2005/03/24 : CIA-RDP83M00171R000200010003-2

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Contribution of Intelligence to Net Assessment
of Performance of Soviet Ballistic Missiles

- National Security Agency - A & W groups;
- Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee; and
- Navy - Navy Intelligence Support Center

25X1 3. These visits should take approximately 1/2 day each and are expected to be completed by 16 December 1977. One trip to USAF Air Force Systems Command Foreign Technology Division is planned during the week of 19 December, as are visits to the following contractors and Government offices during the week of 3 January 1978:



25X1

Attachment A is a draft outline of the final report. Attachment B illustrates matrices in which the pertinent information will be summarized.



25X1

Attachments:

- A. Evaluation of Contribution of Intelligence to Net Assessment of Performance of Soviet Strategic Offensive Missiles
- B. Matrix Summary

25X1 Approved For Release 2005/03/24 : CIA-RDP83M00171R000200010003-2

~~TOP SECRET~~

Distribution:

- Copy 1 - Addressee
2 - SD/OPEI
3 - ID/OPEI
4 - HRD/OPEI
5 - C/PAD/OPBD
6 - C/P&BDD/OPBD
7 - Chrono
8 - Registry
9 -
10 -

25X1

25X1

OPEI/
(8 December 1977)

Approved For Release 2005/03/24 : CIA-RDP83M00171R000200010003-2

Evaluation of Contribution of Intelligence to Net Assessment of
Performance of Soviet Ballistic Missiles

I. Introduction (One liner on priority of this intelligence mission in DCID)

II. Objective


- A. Identify information U.S. policymakers need to make decisions in response to developments concerning Soviet ballistic missiles.
- B. Provide an overview of intelligence support to Soviet ballistic missile analysis, i.e., describe how the needs mentioned above are met.
 - 1. Historical perspective
 - 2. Soviet trends and their impact on collection
 - 3. Intelligence collection trends
- C. Provide a basis for DCI budget decisions in near-term perspective
 - 1. Identify collection programs with high yield to cost ratio
 - 2. Identify gaps in collection that should be investigated
 - 3. Identify analytical efforts that should be strengthened or initiated

III. Scope

- A. Soviet ballistic missiles
 - 1. ICBM - emphasize modifications and new initiatives
 - 2. SLBM - emphasize modifications and new initiatives
 - 3. IRBM - significance to NATO and potential for deployment to within range of the Continental U.S.
- B. Collection systems and programs
 - 1. Those designed with specific capabilities for collecting information about strategic offensive missiles
 - 2. Identify but do not analyze programs with secondary or collateral capabilities to support assessments of ballistic missiles

- IV. Background (to identify requirements of efforts to estimate ballistic missile effectiveness)
- A. Offices with "Ballistic Missile Evaluation" mission (who are U.S. players, hence who are the "customers?")
 - B. Current collection programs
 - C. Review of study efforts - Discuss thrust of studies only. At end of report list references cited in text and give bibliography of other pertinent reports

V.



25X1

VI. Analysis

- A. Relationship of data sources to the model
 - 1. Determination of strategic system existence
 - a. Sensor contributions
 - b. Necessary assumptions
 - c. Processing and data bases required

2. Development of general characteristics
 - a. Sensor contributions
 - b. Necessary assumptions
 - c. Processing and data bases required
3. Development of employment potential and intended utilization
 - a. Sensor contributions
 - b. Necessary assumptions
 - c. Processing and data bases required

NOTE: Summarize above items in a 3 by 3 matrix

4. Relate collection systems to factors to be estimated
 - a. Matrix - collection system vs factors
 - b. Discussion, or analysis, of contribution each system makes to estimating process

NOTE: This process - VI.A.4 - may have to be done separately for ICBM, SLBM, and IRBM

- B. Discussion of uncertainties in data
- C. Role of assumptions in estimates
- D. Summary of appendix addressing sensitivity analysis pertinent to model for estimating effectiveness

VII. Application of Model

- A. Estimates (from NIE)
- B. Effects of data uncertainties on estimates (develop bounds from limiting cases)
- C. Effect of necessary assumptions on estimates
- D. Overall estimate uncertainties
- E. Feedback of applied technology and technical direction for use in future development trends

VIII. Observations and conclusions

- A. Factors where more data holds potential for high marginal returns

- B. Factors where more data can yield only small marginal returns
- C. Factors not vulnerable to existing collection systems
- D. Priorities in collection and analysis
- E. Occasions where valuable information is not effectively used because compartmentation of data or products limit those who legitimately need the information.

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/03/24 : CIA-RDP83M00171R000200010003-2

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/03/24 : CIA-RDP83M00171R000200010003-2